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Introduction
Like most of those who think about Europe, I used to be troubled by its lack of
democracy. There are plenty who try to cleverly argue their way out ofthe so-called
democratie deficit, but none who entirely succeed. The fact remains that the EU is too far
away, too policy-focussed, too convineed of its own importance and rightness, and too
independent to really conform to modem ideas of properly subservient government.
The mystery seemed to me why we allow this to be so. It is not so very difficult to see
what is apparently wrong with Europe from a democratie perspective. Why has there
never been enough public pressure to bring it properly under control?
And then I realised that while the EU is imperfect, so are Europeans. They struggle with
integration, as they struggle with globalisation, liberalism, immigration and social
change. They cannot bring themselves to embrace it with enthusiasm, but are clear-
sighted enough not to turn their backs either. Giving Europe the institutions that would
make it decent would give it solidity too, and so we circle around the inevitable with a
sulky half-heartedness.
The EU is just a mirror, and a conversation partner, to mix metaphors horribly. On the
one hand its gaps and limitations refiect our blind spots and unresolved struggles.
Criticising it is possible, but more interesting is to use it to analyse the real state of
Europe, and of integration, meaning integration as a substantive process occurring within
and between individuals and communities. As a corollary, any criticisms can be passed
on through the EU to those individuals and communities; the buck stops with us.
On the other hand, by looking in this European mirror we get feedback about ourselves,
and join a dialogue with ourselves about all the policy problems of modem societies.
Like a therapist, by letting us see ourselves, the EU helps us get on.
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Which led me to the thought that even, or especially, the EU's failings are helpful. For a
continent in transition, and with strong and recurrent urges to lapse into asentimental and
nostalgie nationalism, there is a value in being confronted with our democratie and
logical inadequacies. This is the EU as agent of truth and of change, and its most
important aspects are then precisely those where it satisfies least. So I came to appreciate
the EU for everything that is wrong with it, and to see the persistenee of its problems and
controversies as a sign that the continent, at last, is not running away from the hopelessly
difficult questions about power and freedom that govemment always brings. We may not
have solved them yet, but we are not ignoring them either.
This essay therefore concentrates on the downside of European integration, in particular
the loss of local autonomy which it entails. It suggests that whether or not this is
worthwhile - and this is not a Eurosceptic essay - it is painful for states and peoples, and
that pain is too often ignored by everyone except foaming-at-the-mouth Europhobes.
Borrowing some ideas from psychology and social science, the essay suggests that if the
EU wants to be more loved it needs to acknowledge and recognise this pain that it is
causing. Some concrete suggestions are made for how laws and courts could be changed
with this end in mind.
Using the theme of loss, the essay interprets recent referenda, notably the Irish, as
reflecting less hostility to Europe than difficulty accepting its consequences, an
unprocessed grief at the partial death of the nation state. The EU needs to help people
through this bereavement, instead of ignoring it. Still, on the bright side, it is notabie that
despite all the apparent political problems of recent years the EU keeps on working. In
fact circumstances around the Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty are like a stress test to
see what the EU can withstand, with the most deeply encouraging results one could
imagine: despite the grumpiness, the disagreements, and the political road accidents, we
just keep on coming back to Brussels to solve our problems. There must be a surprisingly
deep commitment to some kind of EU.
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Ireland
Ireland is a small country but its vote on the Lisbon Treaty was a large blow to those who
thought that the Treaty mattered to the future of Europe. That blow is made all the more
painful by the fact that it is not obvious at the time ofwriting this essay that Lisbon or its
reforms will in fact be instituted any time soon. Other matters have pushed it down the
agenda, to the advantage of those who would see it put away for good.
The Irish referendum nevertheless serves to reveal aspects of the current state of Europe
which are of long er lasting importance, and far greater interest, than the relatively
technical improvements found in the Treaty. It tells us something about the relationship
between Europe and its people, and gives us clues about how that relationship may and
should develop in the future.
The starting point is to ask why the Irish voted as they did. The most distinctive argument
made is that they did not understand the Treaty, and voted no as a default reaction. This is
not something that one hears often in electoral contexts - was not, for example, a
prominent explanation for the French or Dutch referendums - and so deserves a closer
look.
Assuming that the explanation is correct, and this was indeed an important part ofthe
reason for a majority no vote, there are three, superficially contradictory, points that
should be made as a result:
1. The Irish vote was the most revealing and important of the three recent
referendums, because it is the only one that was rational, was really about
Europe.
2. There is no reason to think that the Irish are hostile to Europe.
3. There is nevertheless a lack of trust between the Irish and Europe.
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The Irish vote was rational
Most policy issues are a mixture ofpreference and technocracy. The question ofwhat
should be done depends partlyon what people want, and partlyon what measures will in
fact achieve that goal. The first part of this is measurable by polls such as referenda.
However, the second part is hostile to democracy. There are many technical issues where
the experts really do know best, and the fact that a popular vote might support, e.g.
building more roads to reduce traffic jams, does not mean that the action is any more
likely to lead to the desired result.
An ideal situation might involve a clear separation ofpreferences and methods, the one
determined by the public, the second by the experts. This would be a technoeratic
democracy as described by some well-known theorists of Europe.' We choose growth, a
clean environment, social peace and good services, and the experts work out how to
achieve that.
Unfortunately the worlds ofmeans and of ends are often not separable. We may have
rational preferences about how our goals should be achieved as weIl as about what the
goals should be. Methods bring costs; more roads might reduce traffic jams, but would
also reduce the available countryside. The balancing of costs and benefits is something
that is once again a question ofpreferenee properly placed in the hands of the people.
Yet complicating things is the fact that experts are unreliable, certainly in areas such as
economie and social policy. What they think will happen often does not. This adds
another layer to the cost-benefit analysis. More roads might be acceptable if this would
certainly reduce traffic jams, but the cost may not be worth bearing just for a chance that
jams will be reduced.
Voters are therefore required to make choices about technical policies, even though they
are not in a position to meaningfully assess the content of those policies. The way to do
this is not to play the amateur expert, or take a guess on technical issues, but instead to
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form a view on the people offering the different options. That view is partly an
assessment ofthe reliability ofthose in question - will they get it right? However, it is
also a more global view on their values and attitudes - assuming they don't get it right, as
so often happens, will they respond to the new circumstances in a way that 1 would
approve of? Are they people 1 feel comfortable with? Voting is made personal, but also
accessible and rational, since the judgment of character is not a fully-functioning science,
and is as well-placed in the hands of citizens as of officials or experts. There is not yet a
professional monopoly on wisdom about people.
Voting is therefore about our own personal values, and about our judgment of the
character and ability of those we vote for. By contrast, if we try to vote on which policy
will achieve the best results we are as irrational as a patient who overrules their doctor on
a question of medicine or a house-owner who overrules their electrician on a question of
wiring. To say 'I don't trust you' or 'I am not prepared to have those side-effects for this
chance of a cure' - that is rational. To say 'I think this treatment will work best' - that is
delusional.
The oddity of the French and Dutch referenda was that, to read the analyses, in so far as
they were not about domestic polities, they were about the content of the proposed
Constitution itself. The population debated the text and its meaning, what it would mean
for their country and themselves, and formed a view.
This was a wildly silly way to approach the referendum questions. Those who spend their
careers studying these texts are usually unable to agree on what their consequences will
be, but at least know that the relevant factors are diverse and complicated and cannot be
mastered in a few months of public debates. Whatever the public may have thought about
the content of the Constitution, they had no idea what they were talking about. The Dutch
and French referenda are political road accidents which take us little further either in
policy or in understanding.
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The Irish, however, seem to have taken the more rational approach. They realised that the
text of the Lisbon Treaty was impenetrable and that they were not in a position to judge it
in any meaningful way. They were therefore forced to vote in the way that we normally
do when complex policy is involved: by judging not the proposal, but the applicant. The
question before them was 'should I give him what he wants?'
If this is how many Irish people voted, then the referendum was a worthwhile one. While
the Treaty itselfwas never a suitable subject for a popular vote, the subjective
relationship between the EU and the people is. How the public feel about Europe and its
representatives is a matter which a poll is weIl suited to revealing, and which is important
and interesting to know.
The Irish are not necessarily hostile, but there is a relationship problem
Refusing what one does not understand is not necessarily a hostile act. On the contrary,
accepting change which one does not understand demands a very high degree of trust. It
is not surprising that referenda tend to produce conservative results.i The instinct to stay
with the status quo in the absence of overwhelming reasons to change is understandable.
Why should we let every politician with a theory upset the world we know?
All we know from the referendum result is that the EU does not enjoy enough trust or
credit in Ireland for the voters to give it what it was asking for. That does not teIl us that
they trust it less than any other political body, or that they feel hostile to it. They may
have felt that what it was asking for was a very great deal, and simply wanted to say 'not
right now'. Indeed, since the EU made the mistake of selling both the Constitution and
the Lisbon Treaty as very important, avoter listening to the EU might rationally have
thought that these entailed important changes. Then the vote may simply be a 'not now'
vote, not an anti-European one. This is something only time and research will teIl.
Nevertheless, a problem remains. It seems as if the EU wants to go further than the Irish,
and quite possibly other populations, feel comfortable with. A lack ofbalance can be as
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fatal to a relationship as outright animosity. If she wants to hold hands and he wants to go
further, they may in fact both have warm feelings for each other, but the frustration and
humiliation which results from the disparity can blow things apart. So there is no basis
for drawing dramatic conclusions about a rejection of Europe, but there is a very real
reason for concern. Somehow the EU has made errors ofjudgment which have led it to
ask for too much, and push the public onto the back foot. Now it needs to find a way to
show that it is not just greedy for more, and win back trust.
Empathy is more important than efficiency
The diagnosis here is not original: the bond between the EU and its people is not as
strong or as balanced as the EU would like. Somehow it has not earned the feelings it
wants, and that subjective failure now risks impacting on objective policies. Democracy
is biting back, creating a consequent need to worry relatively less about technique and
relatively more about preferences.
A key part of restoring relationships is empathy. If the EU wants public support it needs
to start by considering what it is that the people are going through and what it is that they
are feeling. It needs to look from their point of view.
It is often hard to see the EU doing this. The tendency of its masculine, technocratie, and
performance-oriented institutions is to prefer data to feelings, and objectivity to
subjectivity. The question that Europe asks when it feels rejected is a self-regarding one;
'how can we make the EU better?' That question leads to experts, and prescriptions for
better policies and better explanations.
Perhaps these do work, and perhaps outcomes are improved on the scales that the experts
use. That's nice, but will not solve the problem if it is not what the people want. Are they
distressed about a lack of output legitimacy (the technical name for successful policies)
or a lack oftransparency? Even ifthe EU addresses accountability, and seeks to make its
institutions more democratie and open and reactive to the population, this will not
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necessarily solve the problem. Are democracy and accountability what populations feel is
lacking? The most admirable changes to the EU are likely to be beside the point ifthey
do not flow from an understanding of what it is that people are looking for.
The risk is that one ends up with an efficient, democratie, accountable, transparent EU
that is nonetheless not legitimate. For legitimacy, unlike those other virtues, is subjective.
An institution or system is legitimate when it is accepted as such by the people, since it is
that acceptance which constitutes legitimacy. We may expect acceptance to be increased
by better, opener, more accountable policies and institutions, but it is not a rule. The
people have no obligation to value what the engineers of the system would like them to
value, and sometimes, being people, they may be idiosyncratic, complex, even
interesting. There may be far more subtle matters at stake than European political
discourse has yet addressed.
Integration as a process of loss
The loss ofautonomy
European integration is a process of loss. As states pool their sovereignty and hand over
policy- and decision-making power to the institutions in Brussels they lose autonomy.
For individual Europeans that means power moves further away from them, from their
familiar national institutions to supra-national ones that they, rightly or wrongly, may
perceive to be less accessible, less responsive and less interested in the things that matter
to them.
In practice, increasing the scale on which decisions are made does inevitably mean that
each part, including each individual, counts for less in the whoie. Europeans are correct if
they think that their preferences carry less weight in an integrating Europe than they
would in a nation state. With time that may change: each citizen is of miniscule
importance to policy in any case, even within a city, let alone a continent. Our power
comes ifwe are part of a group, and removing national borders may enable pan-European
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political or pressure or identity groups to form which will re-order the hierarchy of
preferences, and so, for some citizens at least, cause an increase in personal power. The
minority opinion-holder within a state may discover he is part ofthe European consensus.
However, this process is a long term one, and before it is realised the old national order
will see its role diminished, and the citizen will see policy move further from his ballot.
The national role in crucial areas sueh as immigration, the environment, and economie
and monetary policy is ever more marginal in comparison to the European one, while hot
topics in political discourse and the political pages of the media - headscarves, state aid
to banks, extending matemity leave, funding health care, terrorism, renewable energy -
are often govemed or at least bounded by EU rules. Why should the individual voter not
feel that power is slipping away?
The death ofmyths
There are also other kinds ofpsychic costs imposed by integration. We lose certainties
and comforting myths. Integration, for example, is an admission that the nation state
cannot provide the prosperity and security that citizens want. After a long history,
unfettered sovereignty has come to the end of the road, and has little more to offer. If a
new and better Europe emerges it may yet come to be seen by future historians as a
glorious end, but from a national perspective today it looks more like the sad fading away
of an idea that tumed out not to have quite the potential we had hoped for. So long, fair
states. You tried.
But the state is still a major souree of group identity, and the focus of many myths of
collective self-worth. Most nations have their traditions of self-glorification, whether of
institutions, traditions, values, or all three, fuelled by politicians, populists, ceremonies
and festivals, and departments of constitutionallaw and history. Whether one actively
agrees with the message behind all these is almost beside the point: theyare formative.
We use them to bond with our fellow citizens and reassure each other that we are a group.
That does not require us to seriously believe the official message, but it does perhaps
require that it does not become ridiculous. Humiliation of the state encourages the
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disintegration of the people as a whole and the alienation of individuals. Integration is
like telling a child Santa Claus does not exist. Even ifhe knows it really, he may feel
sadder for hearing it said out loud. A fairy tale is gone forever, and the citizen tums to
face a Ionelier world.
The loneliness offreedom - the stressfulness ofchoice
On a more mercenary note, the EU brings with it freer markets which lead to new kinds
of loss. The market is often presented as the consumer' s friend, providing him with more
choice, more quality, and more wealth. This is, financial crises notwithstanding, almost
certainly generally true, but is not enough to conclude that markets improve the quality of
life. Choice is not always something we want.
In popular discourse it has become a buzzword, a label for a more consumer friendly
system. Choice is presented as empowerment of the individual, a good in itself. On the
contrary, in many situations choice is a burden, something that is tiring and stressful, that
we would happily be free of. We want the best product or service, but who would not
rather have someone else work out which one that is? Is there really pleasure in analysing
the terms of contracts and policies to see which suits us most?
The reason for choice is that there is no-one we can trust enough to make that decision
for us. The state is seen as having failed in that role with the victory of the West over the
Soviet world. Choice is a central part ofhow regulators think and markets work not
because it is a privilege for consumers, but because it is a way of making them work. It
decentralises decision-making, placing the burden of responsibility on millions of
individual shoulders, because on the whole this leads to better decisions. Being able to
choose is being able to participate in govemment. However, this paradigm does not
address the costs of choice itself. It assumes that if it results in better products and
services then it is worthwhile. But are they so much better that they justify the stress,
energy and anxiety which accompanies having to look out for ourselves?
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It may be that they are, but each transition from monopoly to market will be experienced
as a new weight by citizens, and with the coming of markets in all kinds of services and
products, from telecoms to health care to education, we lose a little of the innocence that
comes when someone else looks after us, and acquire a little of the sadness arising when
we realise that the world is only as good as we can make it. Autonomy is loss too, in
precisely the same way as leaving childhood behind and growing up is. It is rational of
European citizens to feel nostalgia for a time without difficult choices, when material
wealth was less but responsibilities were less too.
These costs of integration do not mean that it is bad, just that it has two sides. However,
when the EU feels under pressure from public negativity or Eurosceptic attacks it rarely
concedes this simple point. Officialliterature and statements, political and even academie
writing, explain why policies are good for Europeans, or how they could be even better.
There is however little attention to the downside. Many things that the EU does are
worthwhile, but should nevertheless be done with a measure of regret: change brings
benefits, but is also loss. That regret is visible only in the words of the EU's opponents. It
is rarely conceded from the European side.
If one ignores the effects of one's actions on others, one has a small chance ofbecoming
popular. If courtesy consists in trying to make others feel comfortable, and empathy
consists in understanding what others feel, then the EU is defective in both. It may be
working hard for the good of Europeans but it refuses to see or acknowledge what they
are actually feeling.
The Kübler-Ross stage theory ofgrief
The psychoiogist Elisabeth Kübler-Ross studied the way individuals experience shocking
news, in particular ofbereavement or the news that they do not have long to live. 3 She
suggested that they typically go through a series of five stages. Initially they experience
denial, which consists in disbelief. The news is simply not accepted as true. This cannot
be so! There must have been amistake! This stage is succeeded by one in which the
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dominant emotion is anger. Individuals are furious at their doctors - how could they have
let this happen? - at the dead person - how selfish! - at those around them - it's because
of them that life was not what it could have been - and so on. Anger then gives way to
bargaining. In this stage the individual tries to buy off fate, making implausible but
comforting deals in their own mind: 'if only he reeovers 1'11 never be mean to him again',
'1'11 change my life and live better from now on if only it can be not true'. The fourth
stage is depression. The various forms of defence against the facts have failed, and the
individual succumbs to sadness. This is the stage that I have referred to in the title of this
essay as 'mouming'. Finally, the depression is replaced by acceptance. The individual
may not be happyabout what has happened or is going to happen, but they are able to
face it and continue living and functioning - to move on.
Kübler-Ross's theory has been adapted over the years but continues to be used. On the
one hand it is rarely maintained that all individuals go through all stages, or even in the
standard order. Rather, the stages are seen as typically occurring phases which are often
found in individuals suffering loss. However, each individual may show a unique pattem,
missing some, or following the stages in an atypical order. On the other hand, the theory
is often applied outside of the sphere of impending death or bereavement, as a more
general explanation ofhow individuals process any severe shock or loss, something
Kübler-Ross intended. The shattering of an important certainty, or the deprivation of an
important feature of one's life, may lead to a bereavement-like process such as she
described.
Where are we now in Europe? Europeans are human, and have suffered loss. There is no
reason not to look for typical features in their reaction to this, and ask if public behaviour
and discourse show any or all ofthe five stages. Ras there been denial or anger? Are we
yet mouming?
It is easy to interpret the first forty years of the EU as largely about denial. The scope of
national sovereignty was fundamentally redefined without this attracting great attention
outside of academie joumals. The public may have been simply unaware, but politicians
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at least refused to see what was right before their eyes. In the last decade or so it is
possible to point to an important role for anger and bargaining: anger showing itself in
the growth of Euroscepticism, and resistance to the spread of European competences, in
failed referenda. Yet the constitutional project and the Lisbon Treaty are equally products
ofbargaining. No-one who studies them can think that they could live up to the hopes
placed in them, that through these textual amendments the EU could discover a role in the
world, act with focus and determination, define itself precisely, and manage its relations
with states better. The idea of these texts as a solution to the EU'schallenges smacks of the
'if only' reasoning from desperation that characterises the bargaining phase. If this
amendment canjust restore the fortunes ofthe EU then we'll all be co-operative and
positive for evermore ...
Depression is perhaps more recent, and evidence may lie in the reduced venom in the
media by comparison with even five years ago. Europe has won few hearts but there
seem fewer people bent on destroying it too. The mood is more sullen than angry. It is as
if populations, perhaps influenced by the security and economie crises of recent years, are
unable to fight the need for Europe any more, but not yet able to accept it wholeheartedly.
We are struggling on the edge of acceptance, but it would be over-optimistic to say that
we have arrived.
Recognition and acceptance
Whatever the accuracy of the speculations above, the question for the EU should be how
it can promote acceptance. How can it help European citizens process their loss-based
resistance and put it behind them? Here the work of a social scientist, Charles Taylor,
suggests some avenues to explore.
Taylor emphasised the importance of recognition to co-existence." For groups to get
along with each other it is sometimes as important that they publicly acknowledge the
needs or beliefs ofthe other, as that they actually act in a way that furthers the other's
interests. Feeling recognised by those around us for what we are is important to our self-
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esteem and feeling of comfort in society. We may prosper, but ifwe are not
acknowledged by the wider society we will feel alienation which may slide into hostility.
This has echoes ofSocrates' observation that 'the unexamined life is not worth living'. It
is not enough to be. There is a human need to be seen, both by ourselves, and by others.
Refiection, both Socrates and Taylor say in different ways, is part of what gives human
life value.
More concretely, Taylor reminds us ofthe insight that train companies and other service
providers have arrived at in recent years; one can get away with a lot if one only says
sorry afterwards. The recognition of another' s problems has a powerfully diminishing
effect on their anger. In Clintonesque terms, if the EU wishes to makes itself accepted by
the people, it needs to show it feels their pain. It must recognise their loss.
Two concrete steps
A feeling of control over one's life is important to happiness. If communities have lost
autonomy, the EU needs to address this. Of course, centralisation should not happen any
more than necessary. However, sometimes it is necessary. Recognition entails in this
context not doing away with EU acts, but taking the loss of autonomy at national and
sub-nationallevel seriously. The EU needs to publicly demonstrate that it values local
autonomy, and that respect for it is built into decision-making processes and policies.
When new acts are considered it needs to be weighed in the balance. The message to be
sent is 'ifwe sometimes have to limit your freedom, we do not do so lightly'.
A principle ofrespect for local autonomy
I suggest that a principle of respect for local autonomy should be entrenched in political
decision-making and in law, and be enforceable by courts. It should require that
centralisation only occurs where the gains justify the cost in local autonomy, and the
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harm to local preferences. Judgments and legislation should be required to explain the
reasoning and evidence behind the balance that has been made.
There are difficulties with this: difficult judgments to be made, but also difficulties with
the gathering and weighing of evidence. How highly do particular states value their
control over a particular policy area? How does one balance that against the gains from
uniformity? However, these things get decided in implicit silence now. The issue cannot
be avoided, merely covered up. It would be more honest, and more effective in winning
back public trust, if the cost-benefit analysis behind centralisation was made more
sophisticated and explicit.
The reader familiar with EU law will be thinking; but is this not a restatement of
subsidiarity, or perhaps proportionality? They do this work, don't they? The answer is a
categorical no.:' Subsidiarity is exclusively concemed with the question ofwho will carry
out EU policies. Should they be implemented fully at the centre, or can parts of the
process be delegated to local institutions and laws? It is to do with efficiency of
implementation, and limits centralisation to what is necessary to achieve EU goals.
However, it has no place for valuing local preferences or autonomy, and provides no
basis at all for a balancing process between the advantages of achieving EU goals fully,
and the corresponding disadvantage of losing local autonomy. It is simply not about this.
Proportionality does involve balancing costs against benefits, and could lend itself to the
role described here. However, it has not been used in this way. There is almost no
precedent for EU action being limited because it is just not worth it, because the costs in
local freedom are too high. Courts could develop proportionality into a fully fledged
principle of respect for local autonomy, or they could treat that principle as an
independent one. It hardly matters. What matters is that the principle does not in practice
exist, but it should.
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Moving the Court ofJustice to the centre
A second proposal is to make changes to the Court of Justice. Currently the Treaty
charges it with, alongside the other institutions, carrying out the tasks of the Community
(not the EU, since it is largely a feature ofpolicies which fall within the EC Treaty rather
than the EU Treaty)." That is wrong. It should be neutral between the EU and the
Member States. Can one imagine the US Supreme Court being presented as a tooI of the
federal government, or a national supreme court being entrusted with the goals of the
national government? Courts should be factually and symbolically separate from the
executive, and it is an anachronism that the role of the ECJ in European integration is
bundled with the roles of the other institutions, such as the Commission and Council, as if
all of them are working together. On the contrary, courts should be structurally in tension
with substantive policies. They need not be obstructive, but they are there to constrain
government as much as to assist it. Since disputes about EU law ultimately determine the
proper scope of competence ofthe EU, for the Court to be a neutral adjudicator it must
have as much distance from the ambitions and goals of the EU as from the ambitions and
goals ofthe other party, be that a state or a private individual or organisation. It should be
apart. The Lisbon Treaty is in fact slightly better on this score, amending the wording of
the relevant artiele to at least acknowledge interests other than those ofthe EU, but it is
not good enough," There is still nothing in the Treaty unambiguously providing that this
court, which decides the boundaries between the EU and states, stands between these two
parties, instead of on one side of the fence.
This may seem like a minor point - does it really make a difference? Yet that is an
argument in favour of the change too - if it' s no big deal, then let' s do it. Judges take
texts seriously. We should think about the texts we give them. Right now we tell them to
take sides.
Many commentators have suggested a new constitutional court, dealing with cases of
constitutional importance, as a different kind of response to the sort of concerns about
structural bias addressed above." A constitutional court, it has been felt, would more
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easily distance itself from day to day EU policy and be less likely to marginalise national
concerns. Yet the problem is that all EU law cases are constitutional. In interpreting EU
rules every case defines how far EU power extends, and it is not always the headline
articles in the Treaty or the best-known legislation that turns out to have the most impact.
There is no obviously clear or coherent line between constitutional EU cases and others.
Worthwhile integration
It is easy to argue that the proposals here are no more than a step backwards. They are de-
integration. As such they are hostile to the EU and its mission.
I reject that. For one thing, taking autonomy seriously does not mean it always prevails.
Much of the value of the proposals here is in making public a process of reasoning and
weighing. The outcomes do not always need to change for that to have a purpose.
More fundamentally, it may be time to reassess what integration is about. Is it about
gradually creating a broader, tighter and more uniform structure of law and policy, or is it
about bringing peoples and states closer together? The two are related, but will not
always follow the same path. Mutual trust and respect, with less law, may be more of an
achievement than uniform law, without trust and respect. The policy aim should be
integration which actually improves the lives of Europeans.
What kinds of integration are in fact worthwhile? A starting point is that removing
borders loses much of its value ifwhat is on the other side is the same. Economies of
scale remain, enabling more of the same for less, but there are none of the intellectual,
cultural or economie benefits which arise precisely out of the confrontation of different
visions and systems. The contrasting policies resulting from national autonomy lead to
experiment and mutuallearning, even productive competition, and stimulate progress and
ideas.
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This positive view of decentralisation is embraced by the EU with open arms when it
concerns the world ofbusiness. There it is accepted that a diversity ofproviders of goods
and services leads to experiment, feedback, and improvement in quality, and greater
consequent consumer satisfaction than would a central monopoly. The essence of market
economics is that consumers know better what they want than central authorities do, and
giving them freedom to select the product they want will increase satisfaction.
Decentralisation of decision-making, in the name of quality and efficiency, is all the rage.
Yet when it comes to policies that argument is avoided. This is strange because the case
for it remains good: decentralised policy is closer to the wishes of the public, and is likely
to be more adaptable and innovative. States are affected byeach other, and come under
pressure to adapt if their policies are less successful than those of their neighbours. This
may be because individuals and companies migrate, or because the media reports that the
grass is greener elsewhere and creates political pressure to adopt best practices or to
innovate. However, monopolies are bad for quality in the same ways where policy is
concerned as where products are, and diversity has analogous quality-improving effects.
The problem with policy decentralisation is that it conf1icts with trans-national EU
policies. Differences between rules in different states can obstruct trade and migration
between states, and can affect competition between businesses, making the (illusory)
'level playing field' less level. The effect can be that competition between businesses in
different states is reduced, as national rulcs have a certain market closing effect.
There is a difficult choice to be made. Respect for national autonomy entails a readiness
to compromise on the creation of an economically and socially borderless Europe.
Competition between states (regulatory competition) entails a readiness to accept less of
the ordinary competition between businesses. One cannot compete on all levels all of the
time. Current EU thinking is that economie competition must be prized above policy
competition - one is good for Europe, the other is not.
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Yet competition, as a mechanism for delivering products, is ideally suited to those
products where there is a need for constant innovation and responsiveness, and where
tastes may be fluid and diverse. Here decentralisation brings its maximum benefits. This
sounds like a description of social policy, at least as much as a description of standard
markets for goods and services. Competition would seem to be at least as suited to the
former as the latter. Thus if we cannot have total competition on all fronts, and have to
allocate freedom to compete, then we may have to ask ourselves this: which do we need
more - better goods or better policies?
Coping with change
The value of the EU is that it confronts Member States with the need to change. That
need does not come from Europe, but from changes in society, technology, and global
relations. The EU is a messenger and a catalyst. Are states responding? Are they
beginning to accept the message and see themselves in a new light? Ireland suggests the
process of change and integration is going pretty weIl.
It is sometimes said, particularly where EU foreign policy is concemed, that Europe must
'speak with one voice', as ifthis is a test or condition for success. This is invariably just a
dishonest attempt to silence other views. Speaking with one voice is not only a symptom
of a boring society, but also of dictatorship. Free societies have many discordant voices,
and long may it be so. A single view shared by every Member State would be a chilling
and depressing development, and is a disreputable ambition.
Of course states may have to work together. While speaking with different voices is
eminently practical, taking different decisions simultaneously is sometimes impossible.
One cannot simultaneously be yes and no. At times Europe will have to take one
decision, and those opposed will have to abide by it, even though we may hope that they
continue to have enough spirit and civic responsibility to keep saying why it is wrong.
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This is an achievement: passionately disagreeing, and still working together. Apart from
making for a more dynamic and creative society, it shows the commitment ofthose
involved. If you keep coming back to the table with those who seem to disagree with you
on every point, and you respect the majority decisions even while you publicly tear your
hair out - then one can speak of a mature democracy and deeply-rooted institutions.
This is what the Irish no and the other referenda display to us. Despite anger and
frustration at the apparent sabotage of a project to which many states were, at least at the
politicallevel, committed, we will see that that consequences of the referenda are small.
The EU continues to function, to make policy and law, to react to global and local events,
and all states, even those that may be bitterly facing each other down in other contexts,
continue to work together. We have gone beyond the simplistic and tentative stage where
disagreement means divorce. States are bonded on many levels, and those bonds go
deeper than most political accidents do.
At the end ofthe day, the Lisbon Treaty reforms never mattered very much, and the bits
that are most useful will probably be brought in one way or another. Ifthe only question
the referenda answered was about the Treaties they would not deserve to be front page
news for more than a day. But they answered another question, where the answer was
less clear and more important: what happens when we apply some pressure to the
system? The answer should encourage all those who think integration has something
positive to offer. Nietzsche said 'what does not destroy me makes me strenger"," That
may be worth pondering in the context of the EU.
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I would like to say a few words ofthanks:
Ten eerste, Marjolein
Het is een druk jaar geweest. Het had onmogelijk kunnen zijn. Dat het niet zo was kwam
voor een groot deel door jou. Niet tenminste omdat jij beter dan ik kan zien waarover het
nuttig is gestrest te worden, en waarover niet. Maar ook onze gesprekken over, bij
voorbeeld, het verschil tussen denken en voelen waren nuttig. Jij hebt mij niet altijd
overtuigd, maar zoals vaker het geval is, wel beïnvloed.
The second person I would like to thank is my promoter (the supervisor ofmy PhD),
Professor Laurence Gormley. As weIl as giving me my first breaks in academia, he now
serves as my role model in how to run a good department, how to keep standards up, and
how to find the right mix ofhumour, scepticism, and pragmatism when faced with the
consequences of the latest idea to have infected the fevered minds of the powers-that-be.
Laurence, you are a voice of sanity in a surprisingly wacky academie world, and you
continue to be a guide, in many, ifnot all, ways.
Ten derde moet ik de leden van mijn sollicitatiecommissie bedanken voor het vertrouwen
dat zij mij hebben gegeven, en mijn sectie, afdeling en faculteit voor de vriendelijk en
steunende ontvangst die ik heb gekregen. Ik heb met veel mensen gesproken over
plannen, de toekomst, onderwijs, onderzoek, en zelfs het recht. Vooral aan jullie, voor
ideeën en tijd, bedankt.
Ik heb gezegd.
Amsterdam
26th June 2008
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Samenvatting in het Nederlands
Een tijd om te rouwen. Hoe ik mij minder zorgen leerde te maken over
de Europese Unie, en haar te waarderen.
Europese integratie kan niet plaatsvinden zonder verlies: van autonomie, van oude
zekerheden, van het idee dat de staat alleen in de wereld kan staan. Psychologen hebben
gemerkt dat mensen verlies verwerken in stappen. Zij gaan van ontkenning tot boosheid,
zij proberen te onderhandelen, zij rouwen, en uiteindelijk accepteren zij het verlies. Er is
zeker boosheid en ontkenning te zien in de wijze waarop Europese burgers en landen op
de EU reageren, maar ook tekenen van depressie, alsof de rouwfase is begonnen. De EU
zou zich moeten afvragen welke rol zij kan spelen in het bereiken van acceptatie.
Een aanpak is om Europese burgers te laten zien dat de EU de effecten die Europese
beslissingen op het leven van de burgers hebben serieus neemt. Een dergelijke erkenning
van wat een ander voelt heeft een machtig effect en vermindert conflict en vijandigheid.
Dit zou in de praktijk kunnen plaatsvinden door beter en duidelijker respect te tonen voor
lokale autonomie in het rechtssysteem, en door verdragsaanpassingen waardoor de positie
van het Hof van Justitie van de EG meer neutraal wordt. In plaats van steeds te zoeken
om de doelen van de EU te bereiken, zoals nu het geval is, zou het Hof deze doelen
moeten afwegen tegen andere belangen, bijvoorbeeld die van de lidstaten.
De EU is imperfect, te dol op centrale controle, te onafhankelijk van de politiek. Dat
is echter niet de fout van Brussel, maar van ons, de burgers. Wij twijfelen ook over wat
wij ervan willen, en kunnen daardoor Europa moeilijk onder controle krijgen. De EU
werkt dus als een spiegel waarin Europa haar eigen twij fels, tekorten en zwaktes terug
kan zien. Zo bekeken zijn de fouten van de EU haar meest belangrijke kant - hiervan
kunnen wij leren. Dit is niet de EU als staat, maar als katalysator, die Europa helpt te
veranderen.
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De laatste jaren zijn dan ook positief voor de EU geweest. Het belang van de referenda is
niet dat er nee is gezegd; zij waren deel van een gesprek tussen burgers, staten en EU dat
nog niet af is, en er is geen gesprek als iedereen het met elkaar eens is. Af en toe moet er
een nee komen. Te veel eenheid is eng. Echter, het belang van de referenda is dat
ondanks de nee'en, de landen blijven samenwerken. Ruzie over een klein ding - een
verdrag - laat een groter ding zien: dat er een Europese unie bestaat die veel dieper gaat
dan de dagelijkse problemen. Er is dus vooruitgang geweest. Misschien is het minimale
effect op de bredere EU van de beslissingen in Ierland, Nederland en Frankrijk een teken
dat de staten en burgers van Europa langzaam klaar zijn met het rouwen over het
verleden en dat zij reeds zijn begonnen een andere toekomst te accepteren.
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